
Obadiah: Tony Stark was able to build this in a cave! With a box of scraps!
Scientist: Well, I’m sorry. I’m not Tony Stark.
- From the movie, Ironman
Nor is it sensible to assume that one can replicate the success of Zuckerberg, Frind or even Tew just because their concepts seem simple and obvious; its only when you actually try to build your own venture do you realize that execution is everything.
Circa 2008
I started to work on my concept for a startup in the fall of 2008. The idea was born out of what I saw as a gap in the online advertising space. Without going into too much detail, the concept was similar to Wildfire. I bounced the idea off a few potential end-users, i.e. friends and relatives and they all seemed to like it so… I concluded that was all the market research I needed and decided to work full time on mending this glaring gap. I figured in a few years I would bring the economy out of the funk by IPO’ing at a valuation that would put Google to shame.
I talked to a close relative of mine in India to be my co-founder (the tech-lead) for the project. He was the only person I knew who could work with me on a venture like this. Apart from the fact that we had an established relationship, he also had the perfect experience for the job – he worked as a senior application developer at one of the largest software companies in the world, believed in the idea, was enthusiastic about working on it nights and weekends and most importantly, was trustworthy. When I told him the idea, he became very excited about it and that’s what gave the project legs; after all one can’t build a web application without someone who can build a web application. In my head, the project revolved around him, so I was delighted when he agreed. It was going to be very simple, I was going to take care of product management (concept, strategy, features etc) and the business end of things and he would do the development. We expected to have our application developed in 3 months, i.e. by year end 2008.
We worked via phone and web. I didn’t imagine that there would be any hiccups in building the beta version so didn’t think it was worth diving into the nitty-gritty of the development process. So I let him work on building the application and I worked on the teaser, company/investor presentation, 5 year financial model, a beautiful 50 page business plan, incorporation etc. With my background in investment banking, these tasks seemed to me the best use of my time. I thought that it was only a matter of a couple of months before our application would go live so I focused on raising capital as the means to monetization.
As 2008 drew to a close, we were nowhere close to building even a prototype. At this point my we discussed hiring a team of junior developers to help/supplement the development effort. This wasn’t something I envisaged but since my co-founder was the tech expert, I deferred to his judgement. So I made a trip India and spent a few months there setting up an office, infrastructure, investing in software, hardware etc. The costs started piling up. We weren’t using open-source, all our software was licensed. My co-founder was used to developing on the ASP.net platform and that’s what he recommended for our venture so that’s what we went with. The expenses had already gone above what I had expected. Luckily we were being helped out in this regard, my father had some unused office space he let us use so at least we didn’t have to pay for rent.
By the end of 2008 we had a team of five developers. The team presented new challenges, whilst I hoped that the team would be an immediate impact, they in fact turned out to be a liability. My co-founder ended up having to train the developers and it was taking up a lot more of his time than he expected. So instead of writing code, he said he was teaching. He didn’t want to hire a senior developer because he felt that a senior developer would be set in his/her way and it would be difficult to work with one. In short, hiring a team actually set us back both in time and money. On top of that, when I returned to the U.S., the “online” mode of interaction I had with the team was a disaster. in India, a very high premium is still placed on face to face interaction. My e-mails to the team usually were never fully addressed (if ever read) and the timelines were always missed, all in all they just resulted in added frustration.
Back in DC, I started going to tech startup/entrepreneurial events such those hosted by DC’s TECH cocktail, Twin Tech etc to network with fellow entrepreneurs, promote our venture, talk to investors etc (sadly DC is definitely lacking when it comes to catering to the startup community). While going to these events, I witnessed venture after venture being launched while we were still struggling with our homepage. I eventually stopped going to these events as the first thing anyone asked when I talked to them was for a website or demo of our product… which of course we didn’t have. There’s only so much one can coast on by claiming that the portal is still “under development”.
During these months of futile development I decided to try my luck and apply to tech incubators. I applied to LaunchBox Digital, Y Combinator & Baltimore Angels but none of them worked out. I wasn’t surprised at the rejections. To be honest, with the co-founder in India and neither a demo nor a timeline for completion to show for, it was a spectacularly long shot. I was hoping to be accepted on the strength of my idea but thats when I first realized that it’s the execution that matters. I began to realize why that phrase (“execution”) was so constantly harped on in every startup blog, article and book I read.
By the summer of 2009 we still didn’t have a prototype and I had made another long trip to India in the interim. All we had to show for our efforts over the past year were a few terrible looking pages that didn’t function properly, the “demo” didn’t even have error free login. By this time I had spent around $15,000 – $20,000 and I was fast running out of cash. In an act of desperation I decided to pitch to a few Angels and seed stage VC firms by cold calling them; not surprisingly, there were again no takers. The biggest positive I got out of the experience were a few “we like the concept but need market validation” responses. Add to this the fact that we were officially in the midst of the worst recession since the great depression so my chances of raising capital were negative to begin with.
By the fall of 2009, my budget had disappeared into an ever deepening sink-pool of expenses, salaries, software, hardware etc and the project hadn’t yet come to life. There was always one complication after the other. At this point I was wholly frustrated with the project and was beginning to believe that it would never work. I believed I had done everything possible from my end and followed the best approach to launching my venture so I wasn’t sure where to turn to or who to blame. Before I started my project, I wish I had read more articles such as this one where Don Rainey, a general partner at Grotech Ventures talks from experience about how every project takes much longer than expected, that people will let you down and to avoid the misery of sunk costs. I decided to move to India to see if I could upright the sinking ship but it was too late. Our prototype was out of scope, over budget and delayed beyond belief, as such we ceased developmental operations. I had spent around $25,000 and we had run out of money.
In the meanwhile, as I figured out my next move, I joined Athena Energy, a developer of renewable energy projects in the fast growing Indian energy sector. Fast forward a few months to April 2010 and I decided to get back into the startup game, which pretty much brings me current.
These are my 20/20 insights regarding what went wrong:
- The BIGGEST mistake I made was not being more involved with every aspect of the project; I assumed that since my partner had more technical expertise, I could leave everything in that domain to him. This attitude meant the project was doomed even before it began. At such an early stage, things will NEVER work as they are supposed to. No one else will execute for you, you need to be involved in and follow through for everything. There is a great quote from Giga OM founder OM Malik in an interview he gave Sramana Mitra, published in her book Entrepreneur Journeys Volume 2. He talks about how he hired a team to work on the advertising side of his business so he could concentrate on writing his blog (his core business), but that didn’t mean that he forgot about the advertising part.
“A lot of people mistake that when they outsource, they outsource it all. The reality is you outsource the physical function of it, but not the mental piece. It’s still your core competence. Your core business.”
- Building on this point, I should have been much more educated about the software development process. I should have enforced the agile development/lean startup process on my team. This would have changed the entire complexion of the development process. I also should have been more educated about the technologies involved, especially open source, so I could have considered alternatives to ASP.net/Microsoft technologies when the project started getting expensive.
- We started building our application without a clear final product in mind. The technical team assured me that they understood what I wanted whenever I explained the concept to them and gave them a rough mock-up and wrote down some specs. I should have set clear goals. The team did not follow any sort of documentation either. While these may be unnecessary steps for some projects/teams, when working with a team of developers you are not face to face with and who need to be accountable, this was a definite necessity.
- We started designing a prototype that was too complicated. Especially since our concept was outside our area of industry expertise (i.e., advertising), we should have started with a less ambitious prototype.
- I was building our solution with the focus on raising money instead of training all sights on revenue generation. Also also we weren’t conservative… which meant our venture was just a ticking time bomb waiting to implode. Like the U.S. govt., we threw money at every problem instead of understanding the source of the problem and figuring out alternatives.
- Lastly and most importantly, one should be very careful working with family. It is a double edged sword. Go into it knowing what it entails. Know the worst case scenarios, if things don’t go as planned, will you be able to make adjustments?
In parting I think this following quote from Paul Graham very succinctly explains what we did wrong:
“You need three things to create a successful startup: to start with good people, to make something customers actually want, and to spend as little money as possible. Most startups that fail do it because they fail at one of these. A startup that does all three will probably succeed.”
- Paul Graham in “How to Start a Startup“
We clearly failed with the first and third requirements. Since we never launched our product, I didn’t have the pleasure of finding out whether we actually went 0 for 3. Probably a good thing.
Even armed with all this hindsight I am still going through a learning process everyday,but at the very least, I hope I don’t make the same mistakes again. Otherwise I am going to feel like the guy that once said “fool me once, shame on — shame on you. Fool me — you can’t get fooled again.”